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Abstract: Recent research indicates that norms matter for ordinary causal attributions, although 
there is a good deal of debate concerning why they matter. One prominent account—that the impact 
of norms works via the salience of counterfactuals—has received support from a recent paper by 
Icard et al. (2017) reporting a new effect in cases where two agents perform symmetric actions that 
are each individually sufficient to bring about an outcome. But in four recent studies (Sytsma under 
review), I was unable to replicate these findings. In this paper I explore why, investigating a key 
difference between our studies: Icard et al. asked participants about just one agent (single 
evaluations), while I asked them about both agents (joint evaluations). I find that this difference 
helps explain the divergent findings, although the results remain problematic for Icard et al.’s view. 
Further I identity two evaluation effects: there is a general trend for the causal ratings in these cases 
to be lower when using single evaluations than when using joint evaluations, and this difference is 
larger when the agent asked about violates an injunctive norm. I consider four potential explanations 
of the impact of using single or joint evaluations and argue that determining the correct explanation 




Norms, especially injunctive norms, matter for ordinary causal attributions.2 But there is a great deal 
of debate about why they matter. One prominent account—the counterfactual view—has recently 
received strong support through a series of new findings from Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et al. 
(2017).3 These articles identify a fascinating pattern of effects when typical scenarios from the 
literature are modified to remove the norm violation or to change the causal structure. But the 
implications of these findings and the reliability of the purported effects has been challenged by 
Sytsma (under review). Most importantly for present purposes, Icard et al. predict that a common 
effect in the literature for cases involving two agents performing symmetric actions will be reversed 
when the causal structure is changed from both of the two actions being required to bring about the 
outcome (conjunctive) to the actions being individually sufficient for the outcome (disjunctive), but 
 
1 I want to thank Jonathan Kominsky and Joshua Knobe for suggestions on a previous draft of this paper. 
2 See, for examples, Hilton and Slugoski (1986), Alicke (1992), Knobe and Fraser (2008), Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), 
Sytsma et al. (2012), Reuter et al. (2014), Kominsky et al. (2015), Livengood et al. (2017), Icard et al. (2017), Rose 
(2017), Kominsky and Phillips (2019), Livengood and Sytsma (forthcoming), among others. By “ordinary causal 
attributions” I specifically mean the use of language like “X caused Y” (see Sytsma et al. 2019 for further discussion). 
3 See also Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), Halpern and Hitchcock (2015), Phillips et al. (2015), Kominsky and Phillips 
(2019). 
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I was unable to replicate this reversed effect across four studies involving two disjunctive cases. In 
this paper, I further explore this failure. 
In Section 1, I detail these divergent findings and identify five differences between the 
studies conducted by Icard et al. and my studies that might explain the failure of replication. This 
includes that while Icard et al. asked each participant about just one of the agents (single 
evaluations), I followed the first two experiments from Kominsky et al. (2015) and asked each 
participant about both agents (joint evaluations). These differences are tested in Section 2. I find 
significant effects for type of evaluation: across two scenarios used by Icard et al., causal ratings 
were higher when using joint evaluations than when using single evaluations, and this difference 
was notably larger when the agent violated a norm. While no evidence of the predicted reverse 
effect was found using joint evaluations, it was seen in one of the two scenarios when using single 
evaluations. In Section 3, I considering four accounts of the role of single versus joint evaluations in 
arriving at causal judgments. I conclude by noting that insofar as the evaluation effects in part 
explain the divergent findings between Icard et al. (2017) and Sytsma (under review), determining 
the correct explanation of these effects is important for the debates over the impact of norms on 
ordinary causal attributions. 
 
1. Conflicting Findings 
Recent interest in the effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions owes in large part to a series of 
findings by Knobe and Fraser (2008) and Hitchcock and Knobe (2009). These articles presented the 
results of three experiments with a common structure: participants were given a vignette in which 
two agents (or in one study, two wires) perform symmetric actions, jointly bringing about a bad 
outcome. Each of these cases was conjunctive: the two actions together would lead to the outcome, 
but either action alone would not. The key difference between the actions was that one agent 
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violated a norm in performing it, while the other did not. Participants were then asked to assess a 
causal attribution for each agent using joint evaluations. Across these studies the authors found that 
causal ratings were significantly higher for the norm-violating agent than the norm-conforming 
agent. In Sytsma (under review), I refer to this as the cross-agent effect. 
 Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) explained the cross-agent effect in terms of norm-violations 
increasing the salience of counterfactuals on which something more normal was done instead. This 
counterfactual view has since been further developed, including by Kominsky et al. (2015) and 
Icard et al. (2017). And these papers offer additional support for the view by making a series of new 
predictions about what would happen when the norm violation was removed from scenarios like 
those used by Knobe and Fraser (2008) and Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) and/or when the causal 
structure was changed.  
Adding a comparison condition in which neither agent violates a norm, when we look across 
the conditions we find that the normative status of one agent’s action is varied (in one condition she 
violates a norm, in the other she does not), while the normative status of the other agent’s action is 
fixed (she doesn’t violate a norm in either condition). And it has standardly been found that causal 
ratings are higher for the varied agent in the condition where she violates the norm than in the 
condition where she does not. I will refer to this as the varied agent effect.4 Kominsky et al. made a 
further prediction about such cases—that the reverse effect would be found for the fixed agent, with 
causal ratings being lower in the condition where the varied agent violates a norm than in the 
condition where the varied agent does not violate a norm. Further, Kominsky et al. predicted that 
this fixed agent effect would be absent when the causal structure was changed from conjunctive to 
disjunctive: rather than the two actions both being required for the outcome to occur as in 
 
4 Icard et al. (2017) refer to this as “abnormal inflation.” 
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conjunctive cases, in disjunctive cases either action alone is sufficient to bring about the outcome.5 
And Kominsky et al. provided evidence supporting both predictions, with Experiments 1 and 2 
using joint evaluations while Experiment 3 used single evaluations. The explanation offered, along 
with the reliability of the effects, has subsequently been challenged (Sytsma under review), however. 
Extending this work on disjunctive cases, Icard et al. made a further prediction—that the 
varied agent effect will be reversed in disjunctive cases.6 Their first experiment then tested this 
prediction for four cases involving injunctive norms using single evaluations. And they found 
evidence of the predicted effect. Further, Kominsky and Phillips (2019) have recently found the 
same effect. But across four studies, I was unable to find evidence of the reverse varied agent effect 
in two disjunctive cases matching or adapted from scenarios tested by Kominsky et al.—the Motion 
Detector Case and the Email Case—despite using larger sample sizes that should be able to detect 
even a quite small effect. In fact, in the two studies testing the Email Case, I found the opposite 
effect: there was a significant varied agent effect, rather than the predicted reverse varied agent 
effect. Further, putting the predictions of Kominsky et al. and Icard et al. together, they should also 
 
5 Kominsky et al. (2015) refer to the fixed agent effect as “causal superseding,” while Icard et al. (2017) call it 
“supersession.” Kominsky et al.’s explanation of this effect begins with the central claim of the counterfactual view—
that norm violations make counterfactuals in which the norm was not violated salient and that people are more likely to 
consider salient counterfactuals. They then focus on the sufficiency condition for a causal relation. The idea is that when 
this condition holds, the occurrence of an event is sufficient for the occurrence of the outcome. Kominsky et al. then add 
the notion of sensitivity (Woodward 2006): the more likely it is that a causal condition would cease to hold if the 
background conditions were slightly different, the more sensitive it is. Putting these together, their explanation of the 
fixed agent effect is that in a normed conjunctive scenario, people recognize that the varied agent did something 
abnormal (violating the norm). This makes the counterfactual in which she does something more normal instead more 
salient, such that people are more likely to consider this counterfactual. And on this counterfactual, the outcome would 
not have occurred, which highlights the sensitivity of the sufficiency condition for the fixed agent. Finally, following 
Woodward, Kominsky et al. argue that when a sufficiency condition is judged to be highly sensitive, people are 
reluctant to attribute causation. 
6 Icard et al. refer to this as “abnormal deflation.” As with Kominsky et al. (2015), Icard et al.’s prediction begins with 
the core idea behind the counterfactual view—that people are more likely to consider counterfactuals on which an 
abnormal event is replaced with a more normal one. The next step in predicting the reverse varied agent effect calls on 
considerations of necessity: Icard et al. hold that people will be reluctant to judge that an agent caused an outcome when 
they recognize that the agent’s action was not necessary for the outcome (that it would have occurred regardless of 
whether the agent acted). Putting these two ideas together, they predict that people will be more likely to consider what 
would have happened if the varied agent had not acted when she violated a norm compared to when she did not violate 
a norm; and, when people consider this counterfactual in a disjunctive case, they will recognize that the varied agent’s 
action was not necessary for the outcome, making them less likely to judge that she caused it. 
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predict that there will be a reverse cross-agent effect in disjunctive cases where the actions are 
symmetric outside of the norm violation, but I also failed to find evidence of this effect. 
What explains these divergent findings? And is there a reverse varied agent effect or not? To 
begin to answer these questions, it is important to note that there were several differences between 
the study in Icard et al. (2017) and the studies in Sytsma (under review). In addition to using 
different sources for our samples, and the possibility of attendant demographic variation, there are 
five differences that might potentially explain our divergent findings.  
First, my replication of the Motion Detector Case was based on Experiment 3 from 
Kominsky et al., which used just one comprehension check, but Icard et al. added a second testing 
understanding of the causal structure. Thus, it is possible that my study included participants who 
misunderstood the causal structure and that their responses dramatically skewed the results. Second, 
my study for the Email Case used a disjunctive version of the conjunctive scenario tested in 
Kominksy et al.’s Experiment 2, which did not include a comprehension check, whereas Icard et al. 
used a different version with two comprehension checks. Thus, it is again possible that the responses 
of participants who misunderstood the causal structure skewed the results, and it is possible that the 
alternate wording affected participants’ judgments (although it would then be an open question as to 
which version should be preferred). Third, Icard et al. only looked at participants who were 18 years 
of age or older, while my samples included participants who were 16 or 17. And it is possible that 
there is an age effect for such judgments (although it would then be an open question whether the 
judgments of older participants should be emphasized over those of younger participants). Fourth, 
Icard et al. did not exclude non-native English-speakers, while I did, following our standard practice 
in work concerning the responsibility view. Insofar as the studies at issue test judgments concerning 
the application of the English word “caused,” if such judgments differed between native and non-
native speakers, the case could be made that we should emphasize the judgments of more fluent 
 6 
speakers and that this is likely to correlate with being a native speaker.7 Finally, while Icard et al. 
asked participants about just the varied agent (single evaluations), I asked participants about both 
agents (joint evaluations), following previous studies in the literature, including the first two 
experiments from Kominsky et al. (2015). But it might be that there is an evaluation effect, with 
participants’ judgments changing when they consider both agents compared to when they consider 
just one. 
 
2. Testing the Differences 
To further investigate the reverse varied agent effect, in the present experiment I replicated and 
expanded upon Icard et al.’s study with much larger sample sizes. To check the first and second 
differences between the relevant studies in Icard et al. (2017) and Sytsma (under review) noted 
above, I used the same vignettes and comprehension checks as they did for the two scenarios from 
my previous studies (Motion Detector Case, Email Case). To check the fifth difference, I varied 
whether participants were asked about both agents (joint evaluations) or about just one or the other 
of the two agents (single evaluations). To check the third difference, I included non-native English 
speakers in the data set. Finally, to check the fourth difference, I tested whether the inclusion of 
young participants (age 16 or 17) changed the occurrence of the effects.  
 
7 To test the third and fourth differences, I reanalyzed the data for causal attributions for the four studies using 
disjunctive scenarios from Sytsma (under review). First, I ran two ANOVAs with whether the participant was 16 or 17 
and whether they were a native English-speaker as between-participant factors, in addition to scenario (motion detector, 
email) and norm (no violation, violation). For ratings of the varied agent, no significant effects were seen for either 
factor of interest. For ratings of the fixed agent, however, there was a significant interaction effect between age and 
scenario, F(1, 1075)=5.19, p=0.023, η2=0.005. Second, I tested the three effects of interest for each of the two scenarios 
using the restrictions from Icard et al. (excluding 16- and 17-year-olds and including non-native English-speakers). 
These changes did not notably alter the results. Once again for the Motion Detector Case the difference in the means ran 
in the opposite direction to the predicted reverse cross-agent effect although the difference was not significant, 
t(210)=0.41, p=0.34, d=0.04 (V=16885, p=0.37), and similarly for the predicted reverse varied agent effect, 
t(412.47)=1.16, p=0.12, d=0.11 (W=24310, p=0.14), although in line with Kominsky et al. no fixed agent effect was 
found, t(411.12)=0.86, p=0.20, d=0.08 (W=24128, p=0.17). And for the Email Case, against the predictions there was 
still a significant cross-agent effect, t(177)=5.93, p=7.8e-9, d=0.60 (V=3247, p=2.6e-8), varied agent effect, 
t(357.58)=2.26, p=0.012, d=0.24 (W=19356, p=0.015), and fixed agent effect, t(368.74)=3.57, p=0.00020, d=0.37 
(W=20614, p=0.00024). This suggests that the difference in exclusions does not explain the failure to replicate the 
previous findings.  
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2.1 Methods 
Participants were given one of four causal scenarios from Icard et al. (2017)—either the norm 
violation or the no violation vignettes for either their disjunctive version of the Motion Detector 
Case or their disjunctive version of the Email Case.8 Finally, I varied whether participants were 
asked about both agents, just the varied agent (named Billy in both cases), or just the fixed agent 
(named Suzy in both cases). In the Motion Detector Case the two agents work on a project that is 
important for national security. Their boss then either tells both of them to arrive at 9am the next 
morning (no violation) or tells Suzy to arrive at 9am and tells Billy that it is essential that he not 
arrive at that time (norm violation). It then turns out that a motion detector is installed in their room 
and that it will go off if at least one person enters. Both Billy and Suzy arrive at 9am. As such, the 
motion detector goes off. The Email Case involves the two agents working for a company with a 
central computer. Company policy is either that both are permitted to log into the computer in the 
morning (no violation) or that Suzy is permitted to log into the computer in the morning while Billy 
is not (norm violation). It then turns out that if anyone logs into the computer at exactly 9:27am, 
some important emails will be deleted. Both Billy and Suzy log in at exactly 9:27am. As such, some 
important emails are deleted.  
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement 
with the same causal attributions used by Icard et al. on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with “strongly 
disagree,” at 4 with “neutral,” and at 7 with “strongly agree.” For the Motion Detector case these 
were “Billy caused the motion detector to go off” and “Suzy caused the motion detector to go off”; 
for the Email Case they were “Billy caused the e-mails to be deleted” and “Suzy caused the e-mails 
to be deleted.” In the joint evaluation conditions, the order of the two statements was randomized. 
After the evaluation(s), participants were given the two comprehension checks used by Icard et al. 
 
8 Full text for each vignette used in this paper is given in the supplemental materials. 
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in fixed order.9 Participants for each experiment in this paper were recruited through advertising for 
a free personality test on Google, with ads being targeted to people in the United States. In addition 
to responding to the above questions, participants answered basic demographic questions—
including age and whether they are a native English-speaker—and took a 10-item Big Five 
personality inventory after answering the target questions. Results were collected from 3678 
participants age 16 or older. Of these, 860 failed one or both of the comprehension checks, leaving 
2818 responses that were analyzed.10, 11 
 
2.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figures 1 and 2. An ANOVA looking at ratings for the varied agent with norm 
(no violation, violation), scenario (motion detector, email), and design (joint evaluations, single 
evaluations) as between-participants factors showed main effects for norm, F(1, 1886)=25.04, 
p=6.1e-7, η2=0.012, scenario, F(1, 1886)=27.54, p=1.7e-7, η2=0.013, and design, F(1, 1886)=64.86, 
p=1.4e-15, η2=0.032. In addition, there were significant interaction effects for norm and design, F(1, 
1886)=13.73, p=0.00022, η2=0.007, and norm and scenario, F(1, 1886)=26.65, p=2.7e-7, η2=0.013. 
A matching ANOVA looking at ratings for the fixed agent showed main effects for design, F(1, 
1826)=14.95, p=0.00011, η2=0.008, and scenario, F(1, 1826)=4.02, p=0.045, η2=0.002, but not for 
 
9 For the Motion Detector Case the questions were “Who was supposed to show up at 9am?” (Suzy, Billy, Both of them) 
and “The motion detector would go off when it detected how many people?” (1 or more, 2 or more). For the Email Case 
the questions were “When is Billy allowed to log into the central computer?” (Morning, Afternoon) and “How many 
people need to log in to the computer at 9:27am to cause the data to be deleted?” (One or more, Two).  
10 59.3% women (19 non-binary), average age 26.1 years, ranging from 16 to 89. One-way ANOVAs showed no effect 
for gender on either ratings of the varied agent, F(2, 1891)=1.54, p=0.22, η2=0.02, or the fixed agent, F(2, 1831)=0.38, 
p=0.68, η2=0.00. 
11 Of those who failed the checks, 10.2% missed both, while 55.5% missed just the first and 34.3% missed just the 
second. One-way ANOVAs showed no effect for ratings of the varied agent for failing just one or the other of the 
checks, but there was a significant effect for failing both, F(1, 2483)=5.06, p=0.025, η2=0.002, although the effect size 
was negligible. Since the first two studies in Sytsma (under review) included the first check, this suggests that 
differences in the checks do not explain the failure to replicate the reverse varied agent effect. 
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norm, F(1, 1826)=1.76, p=0.19, η2=0.001. There was also a significant interaction effect for design 




Figure 1: Heat maps showing distribution of patterns of responses for the two agents in the joint 
evaluation conditions (for example, 9.2% answered 7 for Suzy and 1 for Billy for the Motion 
Detector Case when Billy violated the norm). Additional columns show the summed percentages 




Figure 2: Results with histograms above the plots of the means for each condition and showing 
95% confidence intervals. 
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 The first thing to note is that there is a significant difference in responses across the two 
scenarios. This is especially pronounced for ratings of the varied agent, most notably when the 
varied agent violates the norm. In the joint evaluation conditions the mean rating for the varied 
agent when he violates the norm was 1.05 points higher for the Email Case than for the Motion 
Detector Case, t(459.73)=5.89, p=3.8e-9, d=0.54 (W=34498, p=3.9e-9). In the single evaluation 
conditions the mean rating was 0.73 points higher, t(502.12)=4.26, p=1.2e-5, d=0.38 (W=39389, 
p=3.9e-5).12 And these differences are reflected in divergent findings between the scenarios for the 
reverse cross-agent and reverse varied agent effects, as discussed below.  
 The second thing to note is that design—whether participants were asked about both agents 
or just one—had a significant effect on ratings for both the varied agent and the fixed agent. Further, 
there was a significant interaction between design and norm for the varied agent. To investigate 
these evaluation effects further, I conducted planned analyses for each of the three effects noted 
above (cross-agent effect, varied agent effect, and fixed agent effect) for both the joint evaluation 
conditions and the single evaluation conditions for each of the two cases. Results of these tests are 
summarized in Table 1. In brief, for the Motion Detector Case, while the reverse cross-agent effect 
and reverse varied agent effect were not found comparing the joint evaluation conditions (in fact, 
there was a significant varied agent effect), significant effects were found comparing the single 
evaluation conditions. In contrast, for the Email Case, the reverse cross-agent effect and reverse 
varied agent effect were not found for either set of conditions; in fact, in each case there was a 
significant effect in the opposite direction. Importantly, though, the effect sizes were smaller in the 
single evaluation conditions than in the joint evaluation conditions. These results suggest that the 
 
12 Since the primary effects at issue are all directional—for instance, the reverse varied agent effect occurring when 
ratings for the varied agent are lower when the varied agent violates a norm than when the varied agent does not violate 
a norm—I’ll use one-tailed tests throughout  except where otherwise noted. And while it is typical to test for effects of 
norms on causal attributions using parametric statistics, the distributions are often non-normal, as is clear from Figure 2; 
as such, I will report non-parametric tests (either Wilcoxon signed rank tests or Wilcoxon rank sum tests) in addition to 
the standard t-tests. 
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reverse effects are more likely to be found using single evaluation (as in Icard et al.) than joint 
evaluation (as in my previous studies).  
 




t(248)=0.96, p=0.17, d=0.09 t(448.01)=1.90, p=0.030, d=0.17 R: t(453.89)=0.86, p=0.19, d=0.08 
V=3666, p=0.18 W=30628, p=0.020 R: W=26083, p=0.11 
Single 
R: t(451.59)=3.58, p=1.9e-4, d=0.34 R: t(447.19)=1.78, p=0.038, d=0.16 R: t(437.52)=1.48, p=0.07, d=0.14 
R: W=21494, p=3.3e-4 R: W=24014, p=0.050 R: W=23646, p=0.076 
Email 
Joint 
t(212)=6.80, p=5.1e-11, d=0.58 t(431.96)=6.90, p=9.5e-12, d=0.66 R: t(426.97)=0.60, p=0.27, d=0.058 
V=3075, p=5.0e-10 W=32490, p=1.2e-11 R: W=22940, p=0.21 
Single 
t(462.72)=3.53, p=2.3e-4, d=0.32 t(522.82)=3.10, p=0.0010, d=0.27 t(460.8)=0.19, p=0.42, d=0.017 
W=37580, p=2.1e-4 W=39502, p=0.0015 W=28286, p=0.38 
 
Table 1: Tests of the cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects. All tests one-tailed, reverse 




  To test the evaluation effects more directly, I analyzed the difference between the joint 
evaluation ratings and the single evaluation ratings for each of the four pairs of conditions, as 
summarized in Table 2. In each pair the mean rating was higher in the joint evaluation condition, 
and it was significantly higher in four of the six conditions. Further, the difference in the means for 
the varied agent when he violates the norm was notably larger than for the other three conditions for 
each scenario—over five times larger than the average of the other three for the Motion Detect Case 
and over twice as large for the Email Case—and this is reflected in the difference in effect sizes.13 
This indicates that there are two evaluation effects for these scenarios. First, we find a general trend 
for causal ratings to be higher when using joint evaluation; second, we find that this difference is 
greater for the varied agent when he violates the norm. 
  
 
13 For the Motion Detector Case there was a small effect for the varied agent when he violates the norm, while each of 
the other effect sizes was negligible (with the former being over four times larger than the average of the latter). For the 
Email Case there was a medium effect for the varied agent when he violates the norm, while the other effects were 
small (with the former being over two times larger than the average of the latter). 
 13 
 





t(438.08)=2.04, p=0.021, d=0.02 t(451.68)=1.10, p=0.14, d=0.10 
W=26785, p=0.022 W=26908, p=0.26 
Violation 
t(485.81)=4.93, p=5.6e-7, d=0.45 t(463.18)=0.30, p=0.38, d=0.028 




t(452.03)=2.44, p=0.0076, d=0.23 t(455.89)=2.73, p=0.0033, d=0.25 
W=31509, p=0.014 W=30504, p=0.0044 
Violation 
t(470.16)=7.14, p=1.8e-12, d=0.65 t(437.71)=3.17, p=8.1e-4, d=0.30 
W=39710, p=9.5e-13 W=29017, p=7.6e-4 
 
Table 2: Tests of evaluation effects, comparing joint evaluation to single evaluation condition. All 




 The results of the present experiment suggest that the divergent results found by Icard et al. 
(2017) and Sytsma (under review) are at least in part explained by evaluation effects. Further, the 
results for the joint evaluation conditions are largely in line with my previous findings—each study 
using the Motion Detector Case failing to find the predicted reverse cross-agent and reverse varied 
agent effects, while each study using the Email Case instead found significant cross-agent and 
varied agent effects. This indicates that the failure of replication was not due to the differences in 
comprehension checks, the wording of the Email Case, or the exclusion of non-native English-
speakers.14  
The results reported above, however, differ from those reported by Icard et al. in including 
16- and 17-year-olds. As such, I repeated the ANOVAs with the excluded age group as a fourth 
factor. No significant effects on ratings of the varied agent were found for this factor, indicating that 
the failure to replicate the reverse varied agent effect is not due to this inclusion. For ratings of the 
fixed agent, however, there was a significant main effect, F(1, 1818)=4.76, p=0.029, η2=0.003, 
although the effect size was negligible. Further, the effects were comparable when excluding this 
 
14 Two differences are worth noting: first, in the previous studies I found no effects for the Motion Detector Case, while 
this time I found a significant varied agent effect; second, in the previous studies I found a significant fixed agent effect 
for the Email Case, but no effect was found for the fixed agent in the present experiment. 
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age group, as summarized in Table 3, except that now a significant reverse fixed agent effect is 
found in the joint evaluation conditions, which runs counter to the prediction made by Kominsky et 
al. (2015). 
 




R: t(99)=0.25, p=0.40, d=0.04 t(175.94)=1.33, p=0.093, d=0.19 R: t(176.79)=1.76, p=0.040, d=0.26 
R: V=492, p=0.39 W=30628, p=0.020 R: W=3334.5, p=0.029 
Single 
R: t(251.18)=3.31, p=5.4e-4, d=0.41 R: t(250.66)=2.17, p=0.016, d=0.27 R: t(230.05)=0.77, p=0.22, d=0.10 
R: W=6506.5, p=4.9e-4 R: W=6732.5, p=0.010 R: W=6413.5, p=0.23 
Email 
Joint 
t(133)=5.81, p=2.2e-8, d=0.63 t(258.26)=5.60, p=2.7e-8, d=0.68 R: t(264.73)=0.22, p=0.41, d=0.03 
V=1370, p=1.8e-7 W=12375, p=5.2e-8 R: W=8867, p=0.35 
Single 
t(329.98)=2.59, p=0.0050, d=0.28 t(312.41)=2.06, p=0.020, d=0.23 R: t(330.79)=0.14, p=0.44, d=0.02 
W=16125, p=0.0053 W=13890, p=0.027 R: W=13790, p=0.47 
 
Table 3: Tests of the cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects, removing 16- and 17-year-





To summarize, of the five differences I noted between the studies in Icard et al. (2017) and Sytsma 
(under review), the results of the present experiment suggest that only the use of single versus joint 
evaluations is a likely explanation of the divergent findings with regard to the reverse varied agent 
effect. In fact, the experiment provides evidence of two evaluation effects: first, there was a general 
effect, with causal ratings tending to be higher when using joint evaluations; second, there was a 
specific effect, with this difference to be greater for the varied agent when he violates the norm. 
Focusing on the reverse varied agent effect, while it was not seen in the joint evaluation conditions, 
it was found when comparing the single evaluation conditions for the Motion Detector Case. Even 
using single evaluations, however, the effect was not found for the Email Case (in fact the opposite 
effect was found). And, it should be noted that in the one set of conditions where the reverse varied 
agent effect was found, the effect size was negligible (d=0.16) and the difference in the means was 
notably smaller than the difference found by Icard et al. (0.29 versus 1.07).  
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The upshot is that only the results for the Motion Detector Case using single evaluations 
provide any support for the prediction made by Icard et al. (2017), and even here the effect is slight. 
In contrast, the results for the Email Case and the results for the Motion Detector Case using joint 
evaluations suggest against the counterfactual view. As such, the present experiment only offers 
support for the counterfactual view if there is reason to discount both the use of joint evaluations 
and the use of the Email Case—despite results using joint evaluations and results using the Email 
Case being part of the evidence previously offered for the counterfactual view. Correspondingly, the 
results raise two explanatory issues: first, the difference between the two scenarios needs to be 
explained; second, the evaluation effects need to be explained. In the remainder of this paper, I’ll 
focus on the second issue. 
 
3. Explaining the Evaluation Effects 
In the previous section we saw evidence for two evaluation effects in disjunctive cases: a general 
effect (across the board ratings were higher when employing joint evaluations than when employing 
single evaluations) and a specific effect (the difference was larger for the varied agent when he 
violates the norm). How are we to explain these effects? In this section, I’ll consider four possible 
accounts.  
 
4.1 Equal Treatment 
The first account I’ll consider was suggested by Jonathan Kominsky. Call this the equal treatment 
account. Focusing on the norm violation conditions in the motion detector case, the idea is that the 
counterfactual view explains the results for the single evaluation conditions: participants tend to 
focus on the counterfactual in which the varied agent does not violate the norm; then, noting that the 
outcome would still occur on that counterfactual, causal ratings for the varied agent are deflated, 
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producing the reverse varied agent effect. The equal treatment account then argues that this effect is 
broken in the joint evaluation conditions due to pragmatic pressures. The idea is that when asked 
about both agents, participants will tend to note that it is strange to treat the agent who violated the 
norm as less causal than the agent who did not violate the norm; after all, their actions were 
symmetric outside of the norm-violation. 
 While the equal treatment account offers a plausible suggestion concerning how using joint 
evaluations might impact participants’ thinking about the task, the data from the present experiment 
does not bear out this explanation. First, looking at the heat maps for the Motion Detector Case in 
Figure 1, we see that when Billy does not violate the norm, 83.4% of participants treat the two 
agents equivalently. This is significantly higher than in the condition where Billy does not violate 
the norm, with just 53.8% of participants treating the two agents equivalently in that condition, 
χ2=45.84, p=6.4e-12. Thus, it does not appear to be the case that the failure to find the reverse varied 
agent effect when using joint evaluations is due to participants thinking it is strange to treat the 
norm-violating agent as less causal than the norm-conforming agent. Instead, the primary difference 
appears to be that in the norm violation condition a significantly lower percentage of participants 
give equivalent neutral ratings for both agents (30.5% vs. 57.0%, χ2=32.45, p=6.1e-9), with a 
corresponding increase in participants giving extremely unequal responses (11.2% versus 0% 
answering 7 for Billy and 1 for Suzy, χ2=27.59, p=7.5e-8; 9.2% versus 0.4% answering 1 for Billy 
and 7 for Suzy, χ2=17.05, p=1.8e-5). This is not readily explained in terms of there being a 
pragmatic pressure to treat the two agents equivalently in the norm violation condition when using 
joint evaluation. In fact, quite the reverse.  
A similar pattern is found for the corresponding conditions for the Email Case. Once again 
there was a significant decrease in the percentage of participants treating the two agents equally 
from the condition in which Billy does not violate a norm (97.8%) to the condition where he 
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violates the norm (61.0%), χ2=89.74, p<2.2e-16. Further, the primary shift was away from treating 
both agents as completely non-causal (20.0% to 4.2%, χ2=23.75, p=5.5e-7) or both agents as neutral 
(36.9% to 16.4%, χ2=22.24, p=1.2e-6), with the largest increase being in participants answering 7 for 
Billy and 1 for Suzy (0.4% to 15.5%, χ2=9.57, p=9.8e-4).  
Finally, it is unclear how the equal treatment account would explain the general effect. 
Insofar as the proposed mechanism produces the specific effect by breaking the reverse varied agent 
effect, it would not apply to the fixed agent or to the varied agent when he does not violate the norm. 
As such, this account seems unable to explain the general difference in causal ratings seen between 
joint and single evaluations.  
 
4.2 Reflectivity 
The second account I’ll consider was suggested by Joshua Knobe. I will refer to this as the 
reflectivity account. The basic idea is that asking participants about both agents promotes thinking 
about the role of each in the scenario, leading to more reflective judgments; in contrast, asking 
about just one of the agents won’t exert this pressure and participants will tend to give more 
intuitive judgments. This could then be spelled out in different ways depending on what one thinks 
the intuitive judgments look like.  
Starting with the counterfactual view, one might suggest that intuitive judgments follow 
counterfactual saliency, focusing on the Motion Detector Case instead of the Email Case. It would 
then be intuitive to judge that Billy is less causal, relative to a baseline, when he violates a norm. 
The counterfactual view is not clear on how the baseline is established, but would predict that when 
Billy violates the norm, ratings for Suzy will be at baseline, and similarly for both agents when 
there is no norm violation. This version of the account would then argue that when asked about both 
agents, participants will reflect further on the situation, considering the role of each agent. One 
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possibility is that this would prompt participants to think about the agents jointly, perhaps noting 
that if neither had performed the action, the outcome would not have occurred. Participants might 
then partition the role in causing the outcome between the agents, perhaps assigning a greater role to 
Billy when he violates the norm. This would then serve to elevate ratings in general (explaining the 
general effect), and to further elevate ratings for the varied agent when he violates the norm 
(explaining the specific effect). 
Alternatively, one could start with a different account of the intuitive judgments. For 
instance, one might focus on the norm-violation conditions of the Email Case instead of the Motion 
Detector Case, finding the default tendency to be to treat the norm-violating agent as more causal, 
then applying the same reasoning as above. This version of the reflectivity account would also be 
able to explain both the general effect and the specific effect, but it would not be in line with the 
counterfactual view. 
 
4.2.1 Time Spent  
One source of evidence with regard to the reflectivity account is the length of time that participants 
spent answering the questions in the above experiment. If asking participants about both agents 
promotes thinking more deeply about the scenario, then we would expect them to take longer in the 
joint evaluation conditions. And if thinking more deeply about the scenario explains the evaluation 
effects, we would expect to see a positive correlation between time spent and responses across 
conditions (general effect), with a larger correlation for the varied agent in the conditions where he 
violates the norm (specific effect). It should be noted, however, that even if the reflectivity account 
is false, there would be reason to expect participants to take slightly longer in the joint evaluation 
conditions (since they are asked an additional question in these conditions that would take some 
time to read and answer). Further, based on the observed evaluation effects in conjunction with the 
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expected difference in time spent, we would expect time spent to show a slight positive correlation 
with participants’ responses.  
To assess the predictions of the reflectivity account, I looked at the timing data for the 
experiment reported in Section 2. Since time spent is susceptible to outliers, I removed participants 
who were outside 1.5 times the interquartile range above the upper quartile or bellow the lower 
quartile for each condition (145 participants in total, 5.1%). The average time spent on the probes 
for the remaining participants was 90.5 seconds, although this varied across the conditions.15 When 
Billy violated the norm in the Motion Detector Case, participants spent 6.4% (5.8s) longer for joint 
evaluation than single evaluation, t(493.12)=2.18, p=0.015, d=0.17. To put this in context, counting 
the words in the vignettes and questions, the joint evaluation text is 5.3% longer than the single 
evaluation text. When neither agent violated the norm, participants spent 8.4% (6.5s) longer, 
t(379.02)=2.62, p=0.0045, d=0.23. (Text 6.9% longer.) When Billy violated the norm in the Email 
Case, participants spent 15.9% (14.2s) longer for joint evaluation than single evaluation, 
t(330.09)=3.21, p=1.7e-5, d=0.38. (Text 4.3% longer.) And when neither agent violated the norm, 
participants spent 16.3% (14.6s) longer, t(349.12)=4.54, p=3.9e-6, d=0.41. (Text 4.7% longer.) 
Overall, given the difference in text length, not to mention the need to then select an answer for a 
further question, while participants did spend longer in the joint evaluation conditions for the 
Motion Detector Case, the difference is not large enough to make a compelling case for the 
reflectivity view. The prospects are slightly more promising for the Email Case, however.  
Turning to the correlations between time spent and participants’ responses, aggregating across 
conditions there was a significant positive correlation for ratings of the varied agent, although the size 
was negligible, r=0.059, t(1799)=2.51, p=0.0060. The correlation was not significant for ratings of 
 
15 An ANOVA looking at time spent showed significant main effects for norm, F(1, 2795)=7.02, p=0.0081, η2=0.002, 
scenario, F(1, 2795)=22.24, p=2.5e-6, η2=0.008, and whether participants were asked about both agents, just the fixed 
agent, or just the varied agent, F(2, 2795)=10.11, p=4.2e-5, η2=0.007; no interaction effects were seen. 
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the fixed agent, r=0.022, t(1735)=0.022, p=0.17. While the correlation is larger for the varied agent, 
which is in line with the prediction made concerning the specific effect, neither correlation would 
appear sufficient to explain the evaluation effects, especially given that we would expect slight 
correlations even if the reflectivity account were false. Further, the correlations for individual 
conditions ran in both directions (nine positive, seven negative) and were generally negligible, with 
none of them being significant using two-tailed tests. Overall, the timing data suggests against the 
reflectivity account.  
 
4.3 Counterfactual Salience 
The third account I’ll consider offers a variation on the counterfactual view, although it is unclear 
how readily this can be fit together with the view given by Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et al. 
(2017). The basic idea is that being asked about just the one agent might make the counterfactual on 
which that agent doesn’t act more salient. In contrast, when people are asked about both agents, this 
effect on counterfactual salience is cancelled out such that neither counterfactual is made more 
salient. This might then explain the general evaluation effect. In the joint evaluation conditions, 
there would be no change in the saliency of the different counterfactuals, and thus no effect on 
causal ratings. By contrast, in single evaluation conditions, the counterfactual on which the agent 
asked about did not act would be more salient, and since the outcome would still occur on that 
counterfactual, causal ratings would be lower.  
 What about the specific effect? Here we might note that counterfactual saliency is not an all-
or-nothing thing and that different factors could make a given counterfactual more or less salient.16 
The counterfactual view holds that norm violations will make the counterfactual on which the norm 
 
16 Alternatively, this explanation could be spelled out in terms of different factors making a given counterfactual more 
likely to be salient to participants. Since the same explanation would follow on either version, I’ll leave this to the side. 
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violation didn’t occur more salient. So, in the conditions where the varied agent violates the norm, 
the counterfactual on which he didn’t act is expected to be more salient. Accepting that asking about 
both agents won’t have an independent effect on counterfactual saliency, in the conditions where 
the varied agent violates the norm it would only be this norm violation that has an impact. In the 
corresponding single evaluation conditions where participants are asked about the varied agent, 
however, both the norm violation and the question would serve to make the counterfactual on which 
that agent didn’t act more salient, further reducing causal ratings.  
If we think of factors affecting counterfactual salience as being simply additive, the 
explanation derived from the counterfactual view will not explain the specific effect. The reason is 
that the impact of the norm violation on ratings of the varied agent would be the same whether 
asking about both agents or just the varied agent, and this would match the general effect. To make 
this clearer, let’s call the impact that the norm violation has on counterfactual saliency N and the 
impact that using single evaluations has on counterfactual saliency E. If these effects are additive, 
then as seen in Table 4, the evaluation effect would correspond to that produced by E for each pair 
of conditions, including for the varied agent when he violates the norm. So, we would have a 
general effect, but not a specific effect. Further, this account would predict the same reverse cross-
agent and reverse varied agent effects in each relevant pair of conditions, whether using joint or 
single evaluations, and this would correspond to the effect produced by N. But the goal was to 
explain the differences with regard to these effects. 
One need not assume that the effects on counterfactual salience would simply be additive, 
however. It might be suggested that when multiple factors affect the salience of a counterfactual, 
these effects reinforce each other, operating in a synergistic fashion. And this would enable the view 
to explain the specific effect. Let’s call the interaction between the two effects on counterfactual 
saliency I. As seen in Table 4, this would mean that comparing the joint and single evaluation 
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conditions for the varied agent when he violates the norm, we would now predict an evaluation 
effect that corresponds with E+I, while the other comparisons would remain as above. Thus, by 
positing a further interaction effect between the factors affecting counterfactual saliency, this 
account is able to explain both the general and specific effects. Further, this would also lead to a 
difference in the expected effects for studies using joint versus single evaluations: we would expect 
the reverse cross-agent effect and reverse varied agent effect to be larger by an amount 
corresponding with the impact of I when using single evaluations. While this explanation would 
still predict that we should find these effects using joint evaluations, since the effect would be 
smaller it could be argued that it is less surprising that they were not found in those studies (if still 




Effect on Saliency of Counterfactual 
Varied Agent Fixed Agent 
No Norm Violation 
Joint Evaluation   
Single Evaluation E E 
Evaluation Effect: Difference Between Joint and Single E E 
Norm Violation: Additive 
Joint Evaluation N  
Single Evaluation N + E E 
Evaluation Effect: Difference Between Joint and Single E E 
Norm Violation: With Interaction 
Joint Evaluation N  
Single Evaluation N + E + I E 
Evaluation Effect: Difference Between Joint and Single E + I E 
 
Table 4: Effects on counterfactual saliency and corresponding evaluation effects for the explanation 










The final account I’ll consider is based on our competing explanation of the effect of norms on 
causal attributions—the responsibility view.17 I’ll refer to this as the singling-out account. To set-up 
this account, I need to first briefly lay out the responsibility view and detail how this view applies to 
disjunctive cases. 
The core idea of the responsibility view is that the ordinary concept of causation typically at 
play in causal attributions has a normative component, with the result that causal attributions are 
generally akin to responsibility attributions. Thus, causal attributions—claims that X caused Y—
typically serve to indicate something more than that an entity brought about an outcome; they also 
express a normative evaluation similar to saying that the entity is responsible for or accountable for 
the outcome. As such, while we expect that there will be some differences between causal 
attributions and responsibility attributions, we take responsibility attributions to be a good guide to 
what causal attributions will look like. And in the two studies that tested responsibility attributions 
in Sytsma (under review), causal ratings and responsibility ratings for the Motion Detector Case 
were remarkably similar. As I argue there, it is at best unclear that the occurrence of the reverse 
cross-agent and reverse varied agent effects in disjunctive cases would be problematic for our view.  
What should the responsibility view say about causal ratings for disjunctive cases? Thinking 
about such cases in terms of responsibility attributions, it is not clear cut who we should take to be 
responsible for the outcome, with competing considerations pointing in different directions. The 
first consideration starts by noting that the two agents’ actions are symmetric outside of the norm 
violation. When neither does anything wrong, this suggests that they are equally responsible. This is 
 
17 See Sytsma et al. (2012), Livengood et al. (2017), Sytsma et al. (2019), Livengood and Sytsma (forthcoming), Sytsma 
and Livengood (under review), Sytsma (under review). While I will focus on the responsibility view here, similar points 
might be made following other views from the literature, including Alicke’s blame view (Alicke 1992, 2000; Alicke et 
al. 2011; Rose 2017) and Samland and Waldmann’s pragmatic view (Samland and Waldmann 2016, Samland et al. 
2016). 
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shifted, however, when the varied agent violates the norm. All else being equal, we are typically 
inclined to blame rule-breakers for the harms that result, which suggests that the varied agent 
deserves a greater share of the responsibility. The second consideration starts by noting that all else 
is seldom equal and that in assigning responsibility we typical think about whether there are 
mitigating factors. In disjunctive cases, one potential mitigating factor is the other agent and the fact 
that her action would have brought about the outcome in any case. Recognizing this, when the 
varied agent violates the norm, we might reasonably think that his misdeed was not the root 
problem, since the outcome would have occurred anyway. And, absent information in the scenario 
suggesting otherwise, we might then reason that the varied agent did not know that his action would 
bring about the outcome, and hence that he presumably did not desire to bring about the outcome.18 
Alternatively, we might suspect that the varied agent knew that the other agent would be performing 
her action, and as such had good reason to believe that the outcome would occur regardless of his 
action. Either way, this would seem to mitigate the varied agent’s responsibility, as he would not 
have reason to believe that his action would alter the outcome at issue. 
Thinking about responses to disjunctive cases in terms of these opposing considerations 
arguably fits well with the distributions of responses seen in Figure 1. As noted above, when the 
varied agent does not violate the norm, participants tend to treat the two agents equivalently. When 
the varied agent violates the norm, however, we see responses shift away from this. In the Motion 
Detector Case, the most notable shift is away from treating the two agents as both neutral, with a 
corresponding increase in participants showing complete agreement with the causal attribution for 
the varied agent and complete disagreement with the causal attribution for the fixed agent or vice 
versa. This can be explained in terms of different participants tending to notice or to emphasize one 
 
18 There is a good bit of empirical work indicating that factors related to an agent’s intentions and the foreseeability of 
the outcome matter for responsibility judgments (see, e.g., Cushman 2008, Gailey and Falk 2008, Lagnado and 
Channon 2008, Malle et al. 2014, Young and Saxe 2011). 
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or the other of the two considerations laid out above. And a similar pattern is seen for the Email 
Case, although now the responses tend to shift toward complete agreement with the causal 
attribution for the varied agent. 
The singling-out account expands on this basic framework for explaining causal attributions 
in disjunctive cases. The idea is that using single evaluations produces a pragmatic effect: asking 
about just one person in a complicated situation involving two people raises the question of why the 
same question wasn’t asked about the second person, and this suggests that the first person is being 
singled out. This is likely to strike some participants as being unfair and might lead them to temper 
their responses. When just one agent is singled out, participants might worry that any agreement 
that the agent caused the outcome would be to suggest that that agent was solely responsible for the 
outcome, when the situation is in fact more complicated than that. And, as such, they might be 
reluctant to show agreement, giving a lower rating than they might otherwise have done.  
 The singling-out account can readily explain the general effect: taking causal attributions to  
be akin to responsibility attributions, when asked about just one agent people will have a tendency to 
think about the role of the other agent and so temper their judgment. In contrast, when asked about 
both agents this tendency won’t arise (at least not with regard to the other agent). As such, we would 
predict that causal ratings will be lower in the single evaluation conditions than in the corresponding 
joint evaluation conditions. With regard to the specific effect, the same type of explanation can be 
called on. When comparatively assessing the two agents in the norm violation conditions, participants 
will be likely to recognize that the only relevant difference between them is that one violated a norm 
while the other did not, and this might prompt them to assign a higher degree of responsibility to the 





In this paper I’ve provided evidence that the failure of the studies in Sytsma (under review) to 
replicate two effects for causal attributions predicted by the counterfactual view can be in part 
explained by a pair of effects seen when varying whether participants are asked about both agents in 
a scenario or just one. And I’ve offered four potential explanations of these evaluation effects. 
While the first two are inconsistent with the data from the present experiment, the last two remain 
open possibilities, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to test them. And, of course, it might 
be that some further explanation all together could be given.  
I close by noting that explaining these evaluation effects is important for the debates on the 
effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions, since some key findings at play in these debates 
appear to rest, in part, on whether the studies employ joint or single evaluations. And whether we 
should focus on one type of study or the other would seem to depend, at least in part, on how we 
explain these effects. If the explanation derived from the responsibility view is accurate, then we 
should focus on studies employing joint evaluation, with the result that the present findings would 
strongly favor the responsibility view over the counterfactual view. The reason is that on this 
explanation, the dip in causal ratings for single evaluations would reflect pragmatic concerns about 
unfairly singling out a given agent for blame. If instead the variation on the counterfactual view is 
accurate, then we should instead focus on studies employing single evaluations, with the result that 
the present results by themselves would not favor the responsibility view over the counterfactual 
view. The reason is that on this explanation, the dip in causal ratings for single evaluations would 
reflect that such evaluations make the corresponding counterfactual more salient, amplifying the 
relevant effect.  
That said, even if we should prefer single evaluations over joint evaluations for studying 
causal attributions (and it is at best unclear that we should), the present results are still problematic 
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for the counterfactual view since the predicted effects are reversed in the Email Case even when 
using single evaluations. Further, these effects are notably larger than those found for the Motion 
Detector Case when using single evaluations. Absent an account that explains away these results, 
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